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Abstract—Cloud computing is a technological breakthrough in
computing. It has affected each and every part of the information
technology, from infrastructure to the software deployment, from
programming to the application maintenance. Cloud offers a
wide array of solutions for the current day computing needs
aided with benefits like elasticity, affordability and scalability.
But at the same time, the incidence of malicious cyber activity is
progressively increasing at an unprecedented rate posing critical
threats to both government and enterprise IT infrastructure.
Account or service hijacking is a kind of identity theft and has
evolved to be one of the most rapidly increasing types of cyber-
attack aimed at deceiving end users. This paper presents an in
depth analysis of a cloud security incident that happened on
The New York Times online using account hijacking. Further,
we present incident prevention methods and detailed incident
prevention plan to stop future occurrence of such incidents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has brought a paradigm shift in IT and
has redefined the way businesses and government systems
operate. Cloud computing has unearthed its huge potential with
the concept of server to service based transformation along
with benefits like coherence, high availability and economies
of scale. However, along with the technological advances,
cloud computing has also become an avenue for advanced
security challenges with new threats and vulnerabilities over
time. These threats are questioning the efficiency of security
practices implemented to safeguard the IT infrastructure. Se-
curing IT infrastructure is more about protecting the intellec-
tual assets than defending the security perimeters. Almost 60%
of organizations have started using cloud services globally and
the rate of migration to cloud environment in developed coun-
tries is exponential. For instance, New Zealand is experiencing
around 175% growth in migration of small and medium scale
companies to cloud. However, moving organizational data
stored in a centrally located server to cloud storage increases
the risk of data being compromised. Hence, it is of ample
significance to identify the possible risks and accordingly
formulate feasible counter measures prior to moving the IT
infrastructure to the cloud.
Realizing the promises offered and the risks associated
with cloud computing, most advanced and effective security
solution are of highest importance [1]. An efficient secu-
rity solution is one that strictly follows the best practices
to combat the most uniquely featured sophisticated threats,
thus manifesting the organization specific security policies.
The most predominant security risk associated with cloud
computing is its tendency not to note of or consider sensitive IT
information[2]. Though cloud technologies offer inexpensive
and speedy services, security of IT processes are compromised
if appropriate safety measures are not enforced. To compe-
tently handle cloud security challenges and to benefit from the
gains offered by the cloud, efficient security policies need to
be designed and implemented thus protecting the organizations
intellectual assets [3], [4].
Earlier, most organizations, Small and Medium Scales
Enterprises (SMEs) in particular, have not considered the
importance of cyber risks, as they lack in effectively iden-
tifying and quantifying the losses that would occur as a
result of cyber-attacks. Due to recent cybercrime and cyber
terrorism activities, nowadays, every organizations adopt a
cyber security policy and look towards more affordable cyber
security solutions. With this, the development of cyber security
software has entered a new phase with a number of open source
and freeware solutions coming into market which was once
dominated by proprietary software from big organizations like
IBM, Cisco, Norton etc [5].
In a cloud computing environment, the central component
to manage risks is to understand the nature of security threats
[6]. Fundamental element in risk management is, to be aware
of the current happenings and keeping track of expert’ views
on vulnerabilities and threats in order to make well informed
risk management decisions regarding cloud adoption strategies.
Therefore, designing and implementing properly structured
security strategies is of vital importance to deal with the
cyber threats and help the organization to bounce back to
its normal operations as soon as possible and to efficiently
manage the costs incurred due to the loss [7]. The NYT website
was attacked using account hijacking which is considered as
one of the most famous security breaches where in the site
was down for almost 6 hours. In this paper we are going to
present the incident analysis report on the outage of The New
York Times (NYT) online version (http://www.nytimes.com/).
Further, we present incident prevention methods and detailed
incident prevention plan to stop the future occurrence of such
incidents.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I presents intro-
duction to cloud security concepts. Section II briefly presents
the analysis on NYT outage incident. Incident response and
prevention is presented in Section III followed by conclusion
as Section IV.
II. INCIDENT ANALYSIS
A. Background
The New York Times is one the most famous newspaper
established in 1851 with an on line addition that started in
1996. The New York Times website was attacked by Syrian
Electronic Army (SEA), a hackers group from Syria on 27th
August, 2013 [8], [9], [10]. SEA attacked NYT website by
hacking and hijacking the sensitive DNS information of Mel-
bourne IT, an Australian based domain registrar organization,
which manages the domain registry services of the NYT
website along with the websites of other global organizations
like Twitter, Yahoo, etc.
The ultimate target of the Syrian group was the NYT web-
site for which they attacked the IT infrastructure of Melbourne
IT [11]. As a result the NY Times website was intermittently
down for almost 6 hours and visitors to the website had been
redirected to a Syrian website displaying information about
Syrian conflict. The service disruption was the result of a
sophisticated attack for which the SEA had hacked the account
information of a reseller associated with Melbourne IT. Using
the hijacked reseller credentials, SEA had sent a specially
crafted phishing email and notified the recipients to update
their passwords [12]. The changed passwords had been logged
by the attackers and eventually they easily gained access to
the DNS information and modified the DNS names of NYT
thus leading the domain being redirected to a Syrian website
displaying some political information [13].
Fig. 1: Screen shot of Web traffic of The New York Times
Domain [13]
The screen shot presented in Fig. 1, clearly shows how the
web traffic of NYT had been successfully rerouted to their
desired website by changing the DNS server information. The
attackers had also set a Time-to-Live option which usually
will globally cache the changes on the DNS servers for
the entire day. The reversal of these changes might usually
take one full day except if the network personnel purge the
caches on time. Directly hacking the web server of a globally
renowned organization and undermining it by redirecting the
visitors to a political website is not an easy task. Hacking
the IT infrastructure of a DNS hosting service provider and
hacking the information is considerably easier than hacking
the infrastructure of New York Times web infrastructure [12].
Considering the time of the incident and affected user base,
this attack on NYT website is categorized as very severe as per
the threshold diagram mentioned in Fig. 2. Further, targeting
Fig. 2: Incident Severity Matrix
a domain registration organization that also holds accounts of
internet giants like twitter and yahoo shows the severity of
the attack. The security incident that had brought the NYT
website offline is a domain hijacking that belongs to account
or service hijacking cloud security vulnerability [12]. Domain
hijacking implies that the attackers would gain control of the
domain name from the lawful domain owner. It is noteworthy
that in the list of top security threats [14], this type of threat
was ranked at 6 in 2010 and is at number 3 in 2013 which is
a major security concern.
Account or service hijacking is a kind of identity theft and
has evolved to be one of the most rapidly increasing types of
cyber-attack aimed at deceiving end users. It is a process in
which the attackers dishonestly gain access to an individuals
uniquely identifiable information associated with an IT device
or service (email account, bank account, computer account,
etc.) and the information stolen is thus used for unlawful pur-
poses. Typically the compromised account information is used
to impersonate the original account owner. Account hijacking
is usually accomplished through tactics like phishing emails,
spoofed emails, and faux pop-up windows. Users unaware
of the actual motive unknowingly respond to these emails
providing the attackers with credential information, which the
attackers use to modify user accounts, create new accounts and
leave little or no trace by deleting transaction history [15].
In the case of NYT incident, the actual intent of the
attackers was to defame the NYT website. To achieve this,
attackers had tricked the staff of a US-based reseller associated
with Melbourne IT who happened to manage the contracts of
The New York Times and Twitter websites and in due course
bypassed the credential information and went on to change the
DNS record information , also known as DNS poisoning.
B. Incident Analysis
The incident mentioned above occurred as a result of
phishing activity that occurred at one of the retailers of
Melbourne IT. The series of activities resulting in the incident
are explained in the steps below and is presented in Fig. 3.
1) A reseller of Melbourne IT receives a phishing email
2) Fooled by it the reseller provides personal credentials
3) Attacker enters the Melbourne IT infrastructure with
personal credential.
4) Attacker redirects the NYT website traffic.
Though there are multitude of attack vectors, emails had
always been the most popular initial or probing attack vectors.
Phishing is a form of social engineering and is the most
Fig. 3: Step wise representation of The New York Times
Outage Incident
common type of internet fraud where attackers illegitimately
gain access to the user/client credentials and snoop on the user
activities. Subsequently the hackers get hold of sensitive infor-
mation of the organization and alter it with false information
and might ultimately reroute the visitors/users of the website
to spurious sites. Several times the attackers might log the user
activities and might plan for future attacks based on this logged
information. Attackers typically send out custom emails to
clients in the disguise of a genuine request asking for credential
verification. An example of account or service hijacking threat
is the cross-site scripting (XSS) that is an application layer
hacking technique which is most commonly aimed at web
applications. In April 2010, Amazon has experienced XXS
attack which resulted in their user credentials been hijacked.
XSS enables hackers to infuse malicious code in the web pages
and would then gather the user data which is used to bypass
the access controls. The impact of the attack depends on the
sensitivity of the data handled by the affected website and also
on the security policies implemented by the organization.
Fig. 4: CSA: Threat Details cloud services
In a cloud computing environment, the attackers might
often acquire access to sensitive information that is crucial
for deploying the services violating the authenticity of those
services. Hence the cloud service provides must be well
acquainted of the nature of threats and should be well prepared
with defensive techniques to safeguard the organizational IT
infrastructure. An efficient incident response plan has to be in
place to analyzes and measure the loss incurred by the attack.
Through the attack for redirection, there was a threat of major
data loss which was not targeted by the attacker. With this
type of attack, the attacker will have access to critical areas to
compromise the cloud services. For this category, CSA Guid-
ance considers Governance and Enterprise Risk Management,
Incident Response, Notification and Remediation and Identity
and Access Management [14]. These types of incidents may
affect all three cloud services IaaS, PaaS and SaaS.
According to CSA report, this type of threat implies access
control [14]. A detailed description of each one of them with
the reference is presented in Fig. 4. The CSA references for
account and service hijacking is presented as Table I. The
relevance of this threat is stated as 87% in 2013.
TABLE I: CSA references for account hijacking
Domain No Description
2 Enterprise Risk Management
5 Information Management and Data Security
7 Disaster Recovery
9 Incident Response
11 Encryption and Key Management
12 Access Management
C. Root Cause Analysis
After the initial analysis of the incident Third Party error
and Human error are considered as major reasons for the
occurrence of the incident. Third Party Error is considered
since the attack has been done through service providers not
directly on the infrastructure of NYT. This can be due to
the errors committed by employees of the service provider
or resellers. This is a domain attacking and can be done
only by the intended / unintended security incident within the
service provider organization like opening phishing mails or
weak passwords etc., which come under account or service
hijacking. The human error aspect also involves malicious
software attack which most of the time occurs through email
in internet or domain service providers. Though this is not a
direct attack, Melbourne IT is considered as responsible since
their level of access and security policy for changing domain
key is evidently quite low. Following are the immediate steps
(in sequence) that are supposed to be taken in response to the
incident and the sequences is presented below.
1) Password reset of all the accounts involved
2) Accounts involved have been notified about the inci-
dent and accounts suspended for possibility of their
current passwords having been compromised
3) Immediate password change request for affected ac-
counts
4) Restoring DNS records back to their original values
III. INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN
Incident Response plan plays a major role in mitigating the
loss or damage occurred and aids by way of a quick response
to stop the immediate re-occurrence of the same incident.
Looking at the incident response section mentioned above, the
first and foremost measure was to reset all the passwords to
stop the attacker from continuing his work which complies
with the Incident Response Plan which will be introduced later
in this section. If DNS values are set back to the originals
before resetting the passwords, the attacker has an opportunity
to re-launch a similar attack. For account or service hijack
cloud incident, we propose the Incident Response Plan as show
in Fig. 5.
Be ready to Face (BRF) strategy, expecting the occurrence
of worst possible incident. This includes the lessons learnt
Fig. 5: Incident Response Plan
from earlier experiences as well as anticipating future attacks.
Documentation & strategic decision making are the key
factors. Incident Analysis includes but not limited to
What: What has happened? Includes the detailed description
of the Incident
How: Cause of the Incident (root cause analysis)
Can: Can we handle the incident? Has similar incident
been handled in the past?
Immediate Incident Response (IIR) varies with the incident.
If similar incident has been identified in the knowledge reposi-
tory, the same procedures can be followed. Else, primary step is
containment, i.e. safeguard the other services from the attack.
Counter attack procedures may be identified and implemented.
Melody implies linear succession. The Melody of the Remedy
(TMR) consist of sequence of actions to be followed as a
remedies for the incident. This includes extermination of the
incident and proposing remedies to stop further and future
manifestation of the incident which is identifying and blocking
all the possible trespassers. This is followed by Incident post-
mortem Report (IPR) which consists of documenting the steps
and procedure followed for this particular incident including
pre and post incident activities.
IV. INCIDENT PREVENTION MEASURES
After considering the existing standards for these incidents
I propose two types of prevention methods for Melbourne IT.
Firstly, Account credential and User access policy reforms for
Melbourne IT and secondly preventing phishing attacks.
Since the incident is in the category of account or service
hijacking of Cloud Security Incident Framework, there is a
requirement to scrutinize the information security policy of the
cloud service provider organization. We recommend to impose
the following information security policies as a preventive
measure.
A. Account Credential Reforms
Austere control over user credentials should be imple-
mented for accessing any IT resources. When a request for
resetting a password is made, the identity of the user has
to be thoroughly verified. And if the password is reset by
the network administrator, user has to right away change the
password after first time usage. Password protection policies
had to be very strictly formulated and implemented. These
policies need to be reviewed and should be up-to-date with
the business requirements. Emails should be sent to all the
users to reset their passwords in compliance with the changes
in the password policy. For instance, according to the new
password policy, the user should not use passwords used in
recent times. Length of the password should be a minimum of
7 characters and the combination of characters in the password
should be uniquely set. Password strength should be very high.
Passwords expiry process has to be automated and the user
needs to set a new password for every 90 days.
User IDs had to be unique and restriction on group IDs
and shared IDs should be stringently enforced. When the
system is inactive for more than 15 minutes, the password
has to be re-entered by the user to access the system. The
User ID should be locked after four unsuccessful attempts
to login after which only the administrator can enable the
User ID. Furthermore, unused user accounts had to be disabled
and removed periodically. Management has to keep track of
the account activities of users and an activity log has to be
maintained.
B. User Access Policy reforms
User access policies and procedures need to be appro-
priately and amply documented, authorized and strictly im-
plemented to grant and revoke user access to any of the IT
resources based on the user privileges. The access permissions
should comply with business requirements and be on par
with security and service level agreement (SLA) requirements.
Users should be authenticated prior to granting access to
application data, databases and information related to network
configurations etc., Permissions granted to users should be
restricted when requested for mission critical information. The
management has to verify the credibility of the user before ap-
proving the users request to hypersensitive information. When-
ever there is a change of status to a single person at any level
of the organization, user access to the organizational systems
should be timely de-provisioned and revoked. Changes include
inclusion of new business partners, contracts/agreements with
new clients, service alterations to old clients, relocation or
termination of employees etc. Management has to review
the user access information periodically and should carefully
document it. If any access violations are noticed on a particular
user account, the issue has to be resolved with due attention
and should follow the guidelines in access control policies
and procedures. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) adds an
extra layer of defence in which the user authentication process
requires a combination of more than two credentials. Usually
Multi-factor authentication will require a knowledge factor
(something which only the user knows), a possession factor
(something which is specifically possessed by the user) and
an inherence factor (biometric factor). When a user needs
to remotely access the organisational information, MFA adds
an additional level of security thus preventing unauthorized
access. All the activities including authorised and unauthorised
attempts to access the organisational information, information
related to system exceptions, information on security events
should be retained in compliance with information security
policies and regulations. Audit logged information has to be
reviewed on a daily basis. Proper tools should be implemented
to detect intrusions in time and suitable response measures
are necessary to expedite the process of investigation such
that it helps in preventing the re-occurrence of such security
incidents. Access to audit log information should be restricted
to a small group of trustworthy personnel.
C. Preventing Phishing attacks
Cyber criminals are adopting more sophisticated phishing
techniques to forge the identity credentials and critical infor-
mation of an organisation. Phishing attacks cannot be com-
pletely prevented rather it is possible to lower their frequency
of occurrence thereby reducing the damage/loss that might
be incurred. Organisations should adopt proactive approaches
to combat the phishing threats. Ample training should be
provided to users on how to identify and avoid phishing emails.
Professional hackers use cutting-edge techniques to attack their
desired targets. Organizations have to figure out and be familiar
with those tools and techniques employed by the hackers.
In depth analysis has to be performed by organizations to
identify their security shortcomings and thus develop a proper
plan to face and obstruct the incoming attack. Organization
level security practices include Mail server authentication,
digitally signed emails, domain monitoring, gateway services
and managed services.
Additionally, organizations should train their customers &
resellers by conducting awareness programs. Official commu-
nications should be effectively authenticated. Web applications
should be secured and there should be a token based authenti-
cation in place such that whenever the user needs to login using
his/her credentials, a one-time usage PIN number should be
sent to their mobile devices and the generation of this number
should be automated. Users should only be able to access their
accounts when they enter this PIN number along with their
credentials.
Most common type of deceptive technique used by the
attackers would be to make the victim follow to follow a link
attached in the phishing email. The naming conventions of
the host services should not be too complex as they might
sometimes confuse the users. In order to avoid being a target
to any sort of phishing activity, organizations should educate
their users such that they does not hastily respond to emails
sent requesting to reset the user account information, and also
a warning message saying that failing to do so might result in
their accounts being suspended. Attackers also send messages
to threaten the users saying that failing to respond to that
particular email would result in security compromises. In such
situations, users have to make sure if the email was actually
sent by the legitimate website administrators by calling them
over the phone.
Moreover users should be very vigilant and should not click
on links included in the email messages which might inject
malicious virus into the computer and might hijack sensitive
user information and use it for illegitimate purposes. Hackers
might often spoof the websites of renowned organizations and
make them look like the actual sites thus making users believe
that the spoofed site is the original website. Several times
attackers might direct the users to the original website and
setup faux pop-up windows and when the user clicks on these
pop-ups, they provide outsides their sensitive information.
The websites security certificate has to be thoroughly
verified before submitting any personal information. Entering
personal information into pop-up windows should be avoided.
Furthermore, the anti-virus software on the computer must be
up-to-date.
V. CONCLUSION
The analysis of cloud security incident considered for this
report indicates the flaws in the security policy implementation
of Melbourne IT. To achieve their target (NYT), the attacker
has performed extensive and detailed study of NYT’s IT
Infrastructure, its hosting, its service providers as well as
the retailers of the service providers. The attacker found it
easy to target the resellers rather than directly attacking NYT
or Melbourne IT. This paper further proposes both response
and preventive measures in compliance with best industry
practices and international standards. However, cloud service
providers should strictly forbid sharing the account credential
information between clients/users and services and implement
austere authentication techniques where ever necessary.
Along with the authentication practices, organizations
should try to get as minimal information as possible, to
uniquely identify and authenticate their users. Most publicly
available information should not play a key role in the user
authentication process. It can be concluded that an Incident
Response Plan is of paramount importance irrespective of
nature of the incident.
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